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It is important for firms to signal the high quality of their products to consumers
in experience goods markets. Conventional wisdom suggests that a high price can be
a signal of high quality. However, we argue that the role of price in signaling quality
could be weakened when firms resort to the intensive use of targeting in advertising,
which could attenuate the informational content of a high price. As a consequence, a
high quality firm needs to distort its price more to signal its quality. However, when
different levels of targeting are available, a high quality firm may find it optimal to
signal its quality with a lower level of targeting.
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The use of targeting technology has become an important strategy in marketing. It allows a
seller to identify with higher accuracy consumers who are likely to be interested in its product,
which leads to more efficient use of marketing resources. While most digital advertising
channels offer better targeting than traditional mass-media such as TV and newspapers,
the development of digital technology also provides sellers various means of targeting with
different levels of accuracy. For instance, search advertising allows targeting with keywords,
locations, or search/browsing history. Social media nowadays offer advertisers much more
options of narrow targeted audience according to their locations, demographics, interests,
behavior, connections, etc. Banner and display ads, especially re-targeted ones, can show ads
according to what a consumer is browsing and what he/she has previously been interested in.
In spite of being more accurate at reaching the desired audience, the highly targeted social
media and online banner ads are outperformed by search advertising in terms of conversion
rates. For instance, according to HEAP, search engines like Google and Bing almost double
Facebook in conversion rates1. The average conversion rate for Google search ads is almost
five times higher than display ads, with travel and hospitality service having seven times
higher conversion rate on search than on display ads2. Such differences in conversion rates
are, to a large extent, due to the different objectives of advertising channels. For instance,
while search advertising aims more directly at generating sales, social media and display
1“4 Key Facts You Should Know Before Allocating Ad Spend”(March 2018), available at
https://heap.io/blog/data-stories/4-key-facts-you-should-know-before-allocating-ad-spend.
2“Google Ads Benchmarks for YOUR Industry”, available at https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2016/
02/29/google-adwords-industry-benchmarks.
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ads focus more on generating awareness. Yet, another important factor in determining the
conversion rates is consumers’ trust, which is diverging for these advertising channels. For
instance, according to Nielson3, consumers trust most traditional mass-media and they trust
search advertising more than social media, followed by banner ads.4
A key element underlining consumer trust is the uncertainty over product quality, which
may be difficult or impossible to learn prior to purchase (e.g., experience goods such as
travel and hospitality services, financial services, medical and dietary products). Hence, high
quality firms may want to signal their quality to consumers before purchases. Conventional
wisdom suggests that with repeated purchases, a high price can be a credible signal of high
quality. However, with the possibility of targeting, even a firm with a low quality product can
charge a high price to its advertised consumers, provided that these consumers are carefully
selected to have stronger preferences for the firm’s product. Thus, when receiving an ad
promoting a new product at a high price, a consumer may wonder whether the product is
of real good quality or just he/she is being targeted and offered a high price (i.e., a low
quality firm pretending to be of a high quality). For instance, a consumer may be more
skeptical when he/she sees a highly personalized display ad which is clearly related to his
purchase or browsing history, compared to when he/she sees a search ad knowing that all
consumers in a similar geographical area would receive the same ads when searching the
keyword. That is, targeted advertising may dilute the informational content of the ads,
3“Global Trust in Advertising”, September 2015.
4Similar results are found in a more recent survey by MarketingSherpa (2017), which shows the level of
trust for different advertising channels when making a purchase decision: Print ads (82%), TV ads (80%),
Search engine ads (61%), Social media ads (43%), Online banner ads (39%), Online pop-ups (25%). Available
at https://www.marketingsherpa.com/article/chart/channels-customers-trust-most-when-purchasing.
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especially the signaling value of a high price, and interfere with consumers’ perception of the
quality of the advertised product. This becomes more likely as more and more consumers
become aware of targeted ads5 and worry about being exploited6. Hence, a high quality
firm may adopt a marketing strategy with less targeting, so as to make its quality signal
more credible. This may have the further consequence that consumer trust deteriorates on
the highly targeted advertising channel as more high quality firms opt for less targeting.
Our results then offer an insight into the decline of banner and display ads7, the varying
conversion rates for different advertising channels, and may also shed light on the move of
Facebook towards more transparency for advertising on its platform by disclosing to its users
if an ad they’re seeing is served up because of info supplied by a data broker8.
Specifically, we investigate the impact of targeting on quality signaling in a two-period
model à la Milgrom and Roberts (1986): A monopoly firm sells an experience good, of
which a consumer’s valuation depends on both the quality and a horizontal match value.
To reach consumers, the firm engages in informative advertising by sending out advertising
messages informing consumers about the existence, characteristics, and price of the product.
A consumer learns the existence of the product, the match value, and the price when he
receives an ad from the firm. However, the quality, which can be high or low, is known by
5“Survey: 3 Out Of 4 Consumers Now Notice Retargeted Ads”, December 12 2013,
https://marketingland.com/3-out-4-consumers-notice-retargeted-ads-67813.
6According to Samat et al. (2017), being exploited for money is the second biggest concern apart form
privacy concerns for targeted advertising.
7MAGNA Advertising Forecast, Spring 2018, available at https://magnaglobal.com/video-global-ad-
forecast-june-2018/.
8“Facebook sets new rules to regulate targeted advertising”, June 13 2018,
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-sets-new-rules-to-regulate-targeted-advertising/.
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the firm but can only be learned by a consumer after consumption in the first period.9 To
guide his/her purchase decision in the first period, a consumer makes inferences about the
quality from the observed price, and the consumer returns to the firm to purchase in the
second period again if the learned quality justifies the advertised price. As shown in the
literature, with repeated-business effect at work, the high quality firm can signal its quality
with a high price in equilibrium: the low quality firm charges the complete information price,
whereas the high quality firm distorts its price upwards and charges a price higher than the
complete information level.
The use of targeting technology provides the firm with an informative but imperfect signal
about a consumer’s match value, this allows the firm to target its ads towards consumers
with higher match values. We consider this effect of targeting in a simple way: a higher level
of targeting increases the match values of the advertised audience in the sense of First-Order
Stochastic Dominance, i.e., the proportion of consumers with match value higher than a
threshold is higher with a higher level of targeting. This has a direct positive effect on the
profit of the firm regardless of its quality. But this also has an indirect effect on the signaling
cost, i.e., it affects the inference of a consumer about the unobserved quality. As what
becomes clear in the analysis, the signaling cost depends crucially on the mass of departing
consumers from the mimicking low quality firm in the second period. When this mass is
decreasing as the level of targeting increases, the incentive of the low quality firm to mimic
the strategy of the high quality firm becomes higher, as the future loss is reduced. This
makes the high price alone a less credible signal of high quality. Thus, in order to signal its
9Although different sources of information, e.g. customer reviews, provide some information on the
quality, such information is inaccurate, especially when it is confounded with consumer-specific preferences.
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quality and induce the correct inference on quality from consumers, the high quality firm
needs to distort its price even more, which reduces the premium earned by the high quality
firm.
Therefore, when consumers can perceive the difference in the extent of targeting, the high
quality firm may find it optimal to opt for less targeting so as to better signal its quality.
For instance, different advertising channels have different capacity of targeting. A general
newspaper offers less targeting than a specialized one (e.g., a sports newspaper); Online
markets usually offer more targeting capacity than offline markets (e.g., social network vs.
TV). Different online advertising channels also offer different options of targeting as we
discussed at the beginning, where in general search advertising is less targeted compared to
social media advertising and banner ads. Firms may also opt out of targeting completely
by appearing only in the organic search results. This is further facilitated by the fact that
with more and more transparency of data collection and data usage on the Internet, it has
become easier for consumers to tell whether they are seeing targeted or non-targeted ads.
For instance, Google Sponsored Ads are displayed separately from generic search results,
similarly for Amazon Sponsored Products. Facebook also moves towards more transparency
for advertising on its platform. Since July 2018, Facebook requires advertisers to tell its
users if an ad they’re seeing is served up because of info supplied by a data broker.
Thus, when the level of targeting adopted by the firm can be observed/perceived by
consumers, it can serve as an additional tool for signaling quality. Specifically, a high price
in association with a low level of targeting becomes a more credible signal of quality, as it
reduces the low quality firm’s incentive to cheat. Yet, the high quality firm faces a trade-off:
choosing a low targeting level reduces the signaling cost, but also forgoes the benefit from
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targeting. We show that, when the proportion of departing consumers from the mimicking
low quality firm in the second period is decreasing in the level of targeting, adjusting the
level of targeting becomes a more effective way to deter the low quality firm from mimicking
and the high quality firm finds it optimal to signal its quality with a lower level of targeting
(or no targeting at all). We also show that de-targeting is more likely to be profitable for
the high quality firm in a mass-market situation where quality is relatively more important
than the match value.
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature; Section 3 presents
the setup; Section 4 contains the main analysis, with cases of signaling through price only
and signaling through price and level of targeting; Section 5 provides further discussions
and implications of the analysis, and Section 6 concludes with managerial implications and
future research directions. All proofs are included in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our analysis builds on the literature studying the role of price in signaling quality, Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) are among the most influential articles.
Generally, the literature shows that a high price can be a credible signal of high quality.
We further investigate this signaling role of price with the recent development of targeting
technology. This brings our paper in close relation to the emerging literature studying the
impact of targeting. This literature shows how targeting allows firms to segment the market
and perform finer price discrimination or product customization, which affects competition
both in the product market (e.g., Iyer et al. (2005), Yang (2013), Esteves and Resende
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(2016)) and in the advertising market (e.g., Athey and Gans (2010), Levin and Milgrom
(2010), Bergemann and Bonatti (2011), de Corniere and de Nijs (2016)). Yet, the interaction
between targeting and quality signaling remains unexplored in the literature and we try to
bridge the two strands of literature and fill the gap.
Our main insight that a low level of targeting can help a firm signal its high quality is also
related to the literature showing that de-marketing, i.e., reducing marketing intensity and
advertising expenditure, can help a firm establish a high quality image. For instance, Zhao
(2000) shows that a high quality firm spends less in advertising when the ad carries both
roles of attracting awareness and signaling quality, which is then generalized by Bagwell and
Overgaard (2006) to both informative and persuasive advertising. More recently, Miklos-
Thal and Zhang (2013) show that firms can benefit from reducing marketing activities,
which leads consumers to attribute lower sales in earlier periods to insufficient marketing
and improves the perception of quality. Complementary to this literature, we show that de-
targeting can serve as an additional quality signaling tool. Anand and Shachar (2009) also
studies the role of targeting in signaling. However, our approach differs in two ways. First,
they focus on the signaling of horizontal differentiation rather than vertical differentiation,
and thus price is not their main focus. Second, they assume that consumer preference is
correlated with media channel, which makes advertising on a specific channel (targeting) a
signal of horizontal match. In our model, although different media channels can be correlated
with consumers’ match value, it is not necessary for our mechanism to work. Specifically,
in our model, the same group of consumers may be present on different media channels and
targeting can serve as a signaling tool as long as consumers can perceive the difference in
targeting levels across different media channels.
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3 The Setup
A monopoly firm sells a new product of quality q, which can be either high (H) or low (L)
with L < H . The quality difference is denoted by ∆ = H − L. For simplicity, we assume
the cost of producing both qualities to be zero. A consumer’s valuation for the product is
given by
v = qe + x,
where x is an idiosyncratic match value, and qe is the inferred quality of the product.
To reach consumers, the firm needs to send out advertising messages. We assume that
these messages are informative of the existence of the new product, the price of the prod-
uct, and the idiosyncratic match value.10 However, the ad itself does not convey verifiable
information about the quality. We also assume that a consumer does not observe how many
advertising messages the firm has sent out,11 and thus total advertising expenditure cannot
be used as a signal for quality. Hence, to convey information about quality, the firm needs
to resort to other tools. Here, we focus on the use of price as a tool of signaling quality.
Specifically, we consider a simple two period model, following Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), where both consumers and the firm stay in the market for two periods, and the firm
discounts the second period profit by β. We assume that the firm has a fixed budget which
allows it to advertise to a unit mass of consumers.12 At the beginning of the first period,
10That is, receiving an ad fully reveals the match value. In a related article, Anand and Shachar (2009)
studies a model where the ad message does not reveal the match value, but receiving a targeted advertising
message itself signals the match value of a product.
11This is likely true for online advertising, where a consumer is unlikely to observe the amount of advertising
messages the firm sends to other consumers.
12We will study variable cost of advertising in Section 5. This assumption also isolates the mechanism
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the firm commits to a price p for its new product and sends out advertising messages. A
consumer is informed about the existence of the product, the price, and the match value x
when he receives one advertising message from the firm. However, the consumer only learns
the true quality of the product in the second period if he/she had purchased in the first
period. Thus, to guide his/her purchase decision in the first period, a consumer needs to
make inference about the quality based on the observed price. If his/her utility based on the
inferred quality is higher than the price, the consumer purchases in the first period. In the
second period, the firm does not send further messages to its advertised audience in the first
period.13 A consumer who purchased in the first period returns to the firm to purchase again
if his/her utility based on the learned true quality is higher than the price. Otherwise, if a
consumer did not purchase in the first period based on the inferred quality, he/she does not
purchase in the second period either, as no further information on the quality is generated.
It is well-known in the literature (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Bagwell and Riordan
(1991)) that in situations like this, a high price can serve as a credible signal of a high quality
(detailed analysis in the next section), as fewer consumers will return in the second period
to purchase its product at a high price if the low quality firm mimics the strategy of the high
quality firm by charging a high price. This is the “repeated business” effect.
Our analysis aims to investigate how this signaling role of a high price is affected by
the possibility of targeting. To proceed, we work with a very general model of targeting.
discussed in this paper from the mechanism discussed in the literature of de-marketing, for instance, Zhao
(2000) and Miklos-Thal and Zhang (2013).
13As they are already informed about everything of the product, there is no need to advertise to these
“old” customers. However, the firm can advertise to new customers, for which it faces the same problem as
in the first period.
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Specifically, the firm knows the distribution of the match value in the population, given by
F (x), but does not observe the realization of x for each consumer.14 Without targeting,
the firm sends out ad messages randomly and thus the match value among the advertised
audience is still given by F (x). By making use of the targeting technology, the firm is able
to observe an informative but imperfect signal of the match value of a consumer, and then
sends out ad messages to those consumers with higher signals. Thus, on average, the firm is
able to reach consumers with higher match values within its budget. We capture this simple
property of targeting by assuming that the distribution of match value among the advertised
audience is given by F (x; t), where t ∈ [t, T ] represents the available levels of targeting with
the property that: given t′ > t, F (x; t′) ≤ F (x; t) for all x and the inequality is strict for
some x (When F (x; t) is differentiable in t, this means that ∂F (x; t)/∂t ≤ 0). That is, a
higher level of targeting leads to more high value consumers in the advertised audience in the
sense of First-Order Stochastic Dominance. Better targeting generates more precise signals
and allows the firm to advertise more accurately to those high value consumers. However,
to keep our analysis concise and focus on the main insights, we assume that while targeted
advertising is possible, targeted pricing is ruled out.15
Furthermore, we assume that F (x; t) satisfies the following regularity condition:
Assumption 1. F (p− q; t) + pf(p− q; t) is increasing in p, decreasing in q and decreasing
in t.
The first and second part of the assumption is standard in the literature, which ensures
14This also means that the firm cannot price discriminate based on the match value.
15Thus, our analysis is more closely related to the practice of firms targeting a segment of the market, but
relatively less to the practice of deep data mining and personalized offers.
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that the profit maximization problem of a monopolist is well-defined with an interior optimal
price, and the optimal price is increasing with quality. The last part of the assumption is
specific to our setup, it implies that the monopoly price is increasing in the level of targeting.
Hence, as more targeting reaches consumers with higher match values, the firm optimally
adjusts its price upwards. This reflects the benefit of targeting in discovering high value
consumers rather than in expansion of market size.
Lastly, we assume that the structure of the two-period game is common knowledge, except
that the quality of the product is private information of the firm. In the following, we first
study the case when the firm can only signal its quality through price, and then we study
the case when both price and the level of targeting can be used as signals of quality.
4 Quality Signaling with Targeted Advertising
4.1 Benchmark: Complete Information
We start with the benchmark where the quality of the firm’s product can be easily verified
by consumers before purchase. Hence, there is no asymmetric information and no need of
signaling. For a given level of targeting t, the firm simply chooses a price to maximize its




πM(p, q; t) = (1 + β)p · [1 − F (p− q; t)].
Let pM(q; t) and πM(q; t) for q = H,L be the profit maximizing prices and the corresponding
profits under complete information, under Assumption 1, it is straightforward to show that:
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Lemma 1. The complete information price of the high quality firm is higher, i.e., pM(H ; t) ≥
pM(L; t); The complete information price and profit are increasing in the level of targeting,
i.e., pM(q; t′) ≥ pM(q; t) and πM(q; t′) ≥ πM(q; t) for t′ > t.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
That is, regardless of its quality, the firm charges a higher price and obtains a higher
profit with better targeting under complete information. This is due to the fact that tar-
geting allows the firm to reach more high value consumers, which has been one of the main
advantages of targeting.
4.2 Quality Signaling: Separating Equilibrium
Now we turn to the situation when the quality is not observable or cannot be verified by
consumers prior to purchase. The complete information prices continue to be an equilibrium
outcome if they are incentive compatible, specifically, if the low quality firm has no incentive
to mimic the strategy of the high quality firm, i.e.,
πM(L; t) ≥ pM(H ; t)(1− F (pM(H ; t)−H ; t)) + βpM(H ; t)(1− F (pM(H ; t)− L; t)). (1)
That is, if the low quality firm decides to charge the complete information price of the high
quality firm pM(H ; t), consumers (who wrongly believe that the firm is of high quality) with
match value higher than pM(H ; t) − H will purchase in the first period. However, in the
second period, only consumers with match value higher than pM(H ; t) − L will return to
purchase again as the true quality L is revealed. Condition (1) says that such a strategy is
not profitable for the low quality firm.
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In the following, we focus on the more interesting case when Condition (1) is not satisfied,
and thus signaling quality becomes a relevant issue for the high quality firm. As we illustrate
in our model, the observed price is the only tool that the firm can use to signal its quality,
for a given level of targeting. As shown in the literature, e.g., Overgaard (1993), pooling
equilibrium (i.e., the firm charges the same price regardless of its quality) can be ruled out
by the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).16 Hence, we try to look for a separating
equilibrium (pL, pH). Define π(p, q1, q2; t) as the profit of the firm with true quality q2 (in the
second period, the true quality is learned by consumers), while being perceived by consumers
as of quality q1 in the first period. That is,
π(p, q1, q2; t) = p(1− F (p− q1; t)) + βp(1− F (p− q2; t)).
If (pL, pH) constitutes a separating equilibrium, it must satisfy the following two incentive
compatibility constraints:
π(pL, L, L; t) ≥ π(pH , H, L; t), (ICL)
π(pH , H,H ; t) ≥ π(pL, L, L; t). (ICH)
17
That is, the low quality firm has no incentive to mimic the strategy of the high quality firm
by charging a high price (ICL), and vice versa (ICH). Using the definition above, they can
16We provide a formal argument in Appendix A.2.
17Notice that on the right hand side of ICH , we have π(pL, L, L; t) instead of π(pL, L,H ; t), following our
definition of π(p, q1, q2; t). This is because only consumers who have purchased in the first period will return
to purchase again in the second period. Hence, even though returning consumers learn that the true quality




π(pL, L, L; t) ≥ π(pH , H,H ; t)− βpH [F (pH − L; t)− F (pH −H ; t)], (ICL)
π(pH , H,H ; t) ≥ π(pL, L, L; t). (ICH)
As a first step, we have the following result:
Lemma 2. In the separating equilibrium, p∗L(t) = p
M(L; t) and π∗L(t) = π
M(L; t).
This is a standard result in signaling games: when its quality is revealed in the separating
equilibrium, the low quality firm can do no better than charging its complete information
price and earning the complete information profit.18 However, there exists a continuum of
pH that can be supported as an equilibrium for an appropriately specified belief.
19 To further
narrow down the equilibrium set, we focus on the undominated separating equilibrium, which
is unique in such a setup (see, for instance, Overgaard (1993)). In such an equilibrium, the
price of the high quality firm satisfies (binding incentive compatibility constraint)
π∗L(t) = π(pH , H, L; t),
under the belief that the firm must be of low quality if it offered a different price. In
the following, we simply refer this undominated separating equilibrium as the separating
equilibrium. In fact, this refinement selects the profit-maximizing price for the high quality
firm that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints (this is the approach taken by, for
instance, Zhao (2000)). That is, the price of the high quality firm pH is the unique solution
18See, for instance, Overgaard (1993) and Zhao (2000).
19Specifically, any price p′H such that π(p
′
H , H,H ; t) > maxp π(p, L, L; t) and π(p
′
H , H, L; t) < π
∗
L(t) can
be supported as an equilibrium with the belief that the firm is of low quality for any price different from p′H .
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to the following problem:20
maxp π(p,H,H ; t)
s.t. π∗L(t) ≥ π(p,H, L; t),
p ≥ 0.




H(t), H,H ; t) be the cor-
responding profit of the high quality firm. Condition (1) being violated means that in the
separating equilibrium, we must have p∗H(t) > p
M(H ; t):21 due to the repeated business ef-
fect, the low quality firm faces a larger loss if it charged a high price, as fewer consumers
would return in the second period. Thus, an upward distorted price can deter the low quality
firm from mimicking and signal high quality.
We are interested in how targeting affects the profit difference between the high quality
firm and the low quality firm, i.e. ∆π = π∗H(t)− π
∗
L(t), as this determines whether the high
quality firm or the low quality firm benefits more from targeting, taking into consideration
the signaling cost, which further determines the incentive of the firm to invest in quality
improvement (discussed in Section 5).
We start with a sufficient condition under which the high quality firm benefits more from
targeting. Define L(t) = F (p∗H(t)− L; t)− F (p
∗
H(t)−H ; t), we can show that:
Proposition 1. If L(t) is increasing in t, the profit difference ∆π in the separating equilib-
rium is increasing in t.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
20Clearly, if pH ≥ 0 and ICL is satisfied with equality, then ICH is also satisfied.
21This is because the right-hand side of ICL is decreasing in p.
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To be more specific, in the separating equilibrium, ICL must be binding. Thus, the profit
difference is given by
∆π = βp∗H(t)[F (p
∗
H(t)− L; t)− F (p
∗
H(t)−H ; t)].
The direct effect of increasing the level of targeting from t to t′ on the profit difference is
βp∗H(t)
(
[F (p∗H(t)− L; t
′)− F (p∗H(t)−H ; t





which is positive as L(t) is increasing. Moreover, the indirect effect of targeting on the profit







[F (pH − L; t
′) + pHf(pH − L; t
′)− (F (pH −H ; t





is also positive as p∗H(t
′) > p∗H(t) (see the proof for detail) and the integrand is positive due
to Assumption 1. Thus, the profit difference must be increasing in the level of targeting.
In other words, the condition means that the mass of consumers who would leave the
mimicking low quality firm in the second period is increasing in the level of targeting. Thus,
the low quality firm has lower incentives to mimic the strategy of the high quality firm, as
the future loss is higher when targeting improves. When F (x; t) is differentiable in t, the






,22 which means that targeting is more
effective at excluding low value consumers and increases demand more when price is lower.
22For this, we need F (x; t) to be differentiable in t for x in the relevant range. To be more precise, let






H(t)−H is match value of the marginal consumer
for the high quality firm and p∗H(t)− L is the match value of the marginal consumer if the low quality firm
mimics the strategy of the high quality firm. Then we need F (x; t) to have full support on S and differentiable









≥ 0 for x ∈ S.
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In sum, in this situation, with a slight increase in the level of targeting, the high quality firm
can reduce the upward distortion of its price, while still make sure that consumers make the
correct inference on its quality. Put differently, the informational/signaling value of a high
price increases with targeting, by further deterring the low quality firm from cheating.
Things become more complicated when L(t) is decreasing in t. In this case, the direct
effect of targeting on profit difference becomes negative, while the indirect effect of price
change may still be positive and dominate. Intuitively, by continuity, if L(t) is decreasing in
t but only at a slow rate, the high quality firm still benefits more from targeting according





F (p∗H(t)− L; t)− F (p
∗
H(t)−H ; t)




i.e., the lost profit due to leaving consumers in the second period as a proportion of the total
demand, should the low quality firm mimic the price of the high quality firm, we can show
that:
Proposition 2. In the separating equilibrium, the profit difference ∆π is decreasing in t if
Lπ(t) is decreasing in t.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Simply speaking, the condition means that the (proportional) lost profit from departing
consumers in the second period is lower as the level of targeting improves. Hence, the cost of
mimicking is lower for the low quality firm, which exacerbates the quality signaling problem
for the high quality firm and leads to a lower profit premium. In the case of differentiable
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where πs,r = ps[1−F (ps−r; t)] for s ∈ {H,L} and r ∈ {H,L}. That is, the (negative) impact
of targeting on the profit premium earned by the high quality firm is sufficiently stronger
than the (positive) impact of price on the premium,23 which reduces the profit difference.










.24 That is, targeting is more effective at discovering high value
consumers and increases demand more when price is higher, i.e., the benefit of targeting
is higher at a higher price. Thus, as the level of targeting improves, which pushes up
the equilibrium prices, the benefit of targeting grows as well. Hence, the lower quality
firm has a higher incentive to pretend to be the high quality firm to reap the increasing
benefit of targeting. This means that, as the level of targeting increases, the high quality
firm needs to distort its price more upward, in order to deter the low quality firm from
23The term πHH − πHL is the premium the high quality firm earns in the second period compared to a
cheating low quality firm, and πLL − πHL is the loss incurred by the low quality firm in the second period
compared to when it acts honestly.
24Specifically, the right-hand side of Condition (2) is smaller than 1 and the denominator on the left-








mimicking and make sure that consumers make the correct inference on its quality. That is,
the informational/signaling value of a high price decreases with the level of targeting, which
increases the signaling cost.
4.3 Signaling through De-Targeting
Since targeting may raise the signaling cost and reduce the premium that the high quality
firm earns, it may have incentives to signal its quality with a lower level of targeting, when
the choice of targeting level can be observed by consumers, or, when consumers can infer
whether the ad they see is targeted or not. As we discussed in the introduction, this can be
done through different media channels where traditional mass media feature less targeting
than digital marketing channels. Among digital marketing channels, search advertising is less
targeted than banner ads. As information transparency improves on the Internet, consumers
also get to know how their information are used and whether they are seeing targeted ads.25
Specifically, in addition to the price of its product, the firm now also chooses a level of
targeting t ∈ [t, T ], which is observed by consumers. We assume all levels of targeting are
available at no cost and we consider advertising of different levels of targeting which also
differ in effectiveness and costs in the next section. As above, we focus on the separating
equilibrium26 where the high quality firm chooses (tH , pH), whereas the low quality firm
25Such observation/perception of targeting does not require previous interaction with the firm or informa-
tion from peers. Moreover, the ad itself may not contain direct information about whether it is a targeted
ad, but where and why a consumer sees the ad provides such information.
26A pooling equilibrium can be ruled out similarly as in Section 4.2.
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chooses (tL, pL), which must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints:
π(pL, L, L; tL) ≥ π(pH , H, L; tH), (ICL)
π(pH , H,H ; tH) ≥ π(pL, L, L; tL). (ICH)
This can be similarly rewritten as
π(pL, L, L; tL) ≥ π(pH , H,H ; tH)− βpH [F (pH − L; tH)− F (pH −H ; tH)] and pH ≥ 0.
Similar to Lemma 2, in the separating equilibrium, we must have p∗L(tL) = p
M(L; tL), as it
can do no better than charging its complete information price when its quality is revealed
in the separating equilibrium. Since πM(L; tL) is increasing in tL by Assumption 1, in the
separating equilibrium, the low quality firm must choose the highest level of targeting, T ,
and the corresponding price p∗L(T ) = p
M(L;T ).
The price and level of targeting for the high quality firm in the separating equilibrium is
then the solution to the following problem:27
maxp,t π(p,H,H ; t)
s.t. π(p∗L(T ), L, L;T ) ≥ π(p,H,H ; t)− βp[F (p− L; t)− F (p−H ; t)],
p ≥ 0,
under the belief that the firm must be of low quality if it offered a different price and/or it
chose a different level of targeting. To facilitate our analysis, define p∗H(tH) as the equilibrium
price and π∗H(tH) as the equilibrium profit for the high quality firm when the low quality
firm chooses targeting level T and the high quality firm chooses targeting level tH , that is,
27Here, we follow the simple approach as in Zhao (2000) to formulate the equilibrium as a solution to the
high quality firm’s profit-maximizing problem. Similarly, this selects the unique undominated separating
equilibrium.
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p∗H(tH) is the solution to the following problem:
maxp π(p,H,H ; tH)




F (p∗H(tH)− L; tH)− F (p
∗
H(tH)−H ; tH)
1− F (p∗H(tH)−H ; tH)
,
i.e., the proportion of departing consumers from the mimicking low quality firm in the second
period compared to the number of purchasing consumers in the first period. We can show
that:
Proposition 3. The high quality firm’s profit π∗H(tH) is decreasing in its level of targeting
and it chooses the lowest targeting level t if Ld(tH) is decreasing in tH .
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Notice that, when the level of targeting can be used as an additional signal (more specif-
ically, when the low quality firm and the high quality firm can choose different levels of
targeting), the profit of the low quality firm is invariant to the level of targeting chosen by
the high quality firm. Hence, as the proportion of consumers departing from the mimicking
low quality firm gets smaller when the high quality firm targets more, the cost of mimicking
becomes lower as well, which leads to a stronger incentive of mimicking and makes it optimal
for the high quality firm to choose a lower level of targeting. In the differentiable case, the





























That is, the benefit of targeting compared to the damage of high price is relatively smaller
for the high quality firm than the mimicking low quality firm. Consequently, adjusting
downward the targeting level becomes a more effective tool in deterring the low quality firm
from mimicking, and the high quality firm can save signaling cost by opting for a lower level
of targeting.
Moreover, it is easy to check that Condition (4) is more stringent than Condition (2)
when evaluated at tH = T . Thus, it could occur that the high quality firm benefits less from
improved targeting, yet it still chooses a high level of targeting. In addition, the condition
is sufficient for the high quality firm’s profit to be decreasing in its chosen level of targeting,
hence, it chooses the lowest level of targeting. When it is not satisfied for all t, we may
have a non-monotone relationship between the level of targeting and the profit of the high
quality firm, i.e., the high quality firm’s optimal level of targeting could be interior for some
tH ∈ (t, T )
29. This highlights the trade-off faced by the high quality firm: opting for less
targeting can save signaling cost but also forgoes the benefit from targeting. Hence, it is
only optimal to do so when the signaling cost due to targeting is significant enough, i.e.,
28Alternatively, the condition can be rewritten as ǫ ∂π
∂t
,q < ǫ ∂π
∂p
,q, where π(p, q; t) is the per-period profit















is the elasticity of ∂π/∂p with respect to quality q.
29A non-monotone relationship could also occur when the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding
for small enough tH . See Appendix B for an example with exponential distribution, which always satisfies
that Ld(tH) is decreasing in tH .
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when the decrease in the profit difference is large enough as the level of targeting increases.
4.4 An Illustrative Example
We present a concrete example in this section to illustrate our results and generate additional
insights. Consider the following example of the match value with a cumulative distribution
function F (x; t) on the support of [0, 1] and a targeting level t ∈ [0, 1]:
F (x; t) = (1− t)x+ tx2,
the corresponding density function is
f(x; t) = 1− t + 2tx.
The distribution function is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1. Clearly, F (x, t) is
decreasing in t, i.e., as the targeting level becomes higher, the proportion of consumers
with high match values increases. This is demonstrated more clearly in the corresponding
probability density function. As t increases from 0 to 1, f(x; t) rotates counterclockwise
around (1
2
, 1), which is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1.











> 0 if x > 1/2. Thus, a necessary condition
for both Condition (2) and (4) to be satisfied is that the price-quality difference (the match
value of the marginal consumer) in the separating equilibrium locates at the lower-half of
the match value distribution. To be more specific, the profit difference between the high
quality firm and the low quality firm is increasing in the level of targeting if the equilibrium
















Figure 1: Graphical Illustration of the Example
occurs when the quality is relatively low compared to the match value and/or the targeting
level is relatively high. In this case, we say that the firm faces a niche market position,
as it only sells to high value consumers. On the other hand, when the quality is relatively
high compared to the match value and/or when the targeting level is relatively low, the
equilibrium price-quality difference (the match value of the marginal consumer) is relatively
low and it is more likely that the profit difference is decreasing in the level of targeting. We
say, in this case, that the firm faces a mass market position, as it sells to both low and high
value consumers. The impact of targeting on the profit difference is further illustrated in
the left panel of Figure 230.
As explained above, when the quality is relatively high (the solid line with L = 0.9 and
H = 1), the firm faces a mass-market position, the profit difference first decreases with
targeting (for approximately t < 0.2) and then increases with targeting (for approximately
t > 0.2). The reason is that, as targeting level increases, the equilibrium price also increases
and the firm sells to more high-value consumers. This moves the firm gradually from a mass-
30The Figure is drawn for β = 1.
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Figure 2: Impact of Targeting on Profit Difference and Optimal Targeting
market position to a niche-market position, which reverses the impact of targeting. On the
other hand, when the quality is relatively low (the dashed line with L = 0.5 and H = 0.6,
the dotted line with L = 0.1 and H = 0.2), the firm moves to a more niche-market position
and thus targeting is more likely to increase profit difference.
The right panel of Figure 2 demonstrates the optimal choice of targeting by the high
quality firm as a function of the maximally available level of targeting, when the lowest
level of targeting is t = 0. From our analysis in Section 4.3, the low quality firm always
chooses the highest available level of targeting (the 45◦ degree line). In the medium quality
(the triangular with L = 0.5 and H = 0.6) and low quality (the circle with L = 0.1 and
H = 0.2) case, the high quality firm also chooses the highest level of targeting, i.e., it signals
only through price. In the high quality case (the solid circle with L = 0.9 and H = 1), the
figure shows that when the available targeting level is relatively low, the high quality firm
optimally chooses no targeting to signal its quality. However, when the available targeting
26
level is relatively high, the high quality firm instead chooses the highest level of targeting
as well to exploit the benefit of targeting. Recall from above, in this case, the firm faces a
mass-market position, and thus the high quality firm is more likely to be hurt by targeting.31
Furthermore, Figure 2 illustrates that Condition (4) is more stringent than Condition (2).
In the high quality case, while the profit difference is decreasing in the level of targeting
for t < 0.2, the high quality firm only chooses the lowest level of targeting for t < 0.1,
which highlights the trade-off between cost-saving from de-targeting and the forgone benefit
of targeting.
5 Further Discussions
5.1 General Targeting Technology
In the analysis above, we focus on costless targeting, i.e. targeted advertising is available at
no additional cost. When the firm can choose different levels of targeting, for example, when
it relies on different media channels, advertising with different levels of targeting may come
with different degrees of effectiveness and costs. A natural case would be a higher level of
targeting is more effective but also more costly. We capture this by assuming that a level of
targeting t is of effectiveness λ(t) ∈ (0, 1) and is available at a cost of c(t), which satisfies
λ′(t) ≥ 0 and c′(t) ≥ 0. In this case, the complete information profit of the firm with quality
31This insight also generalizes to other density functions that satisfy a single-cross property: f(x; t) is
decreasing in t for x < x∗(t) and increasing in t for x > x∗(t), where x∗(t) is the rotation point. A number
of commonly used distributions satisfy this property, e.g., exponential, chi-square, chi distribution, etc.
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q ∈ {L,H} is
πM(p, q; t) = (1 + β)λ(t)p[1− F (p− q; t)]− c(t).
That is, an ad with a targeting level t only turns a potential customer (whose value q+x > p)
into an actual customer (who purchases the product) with probability λ(t). Without loss of
generality, assuming the complete information profit is increasing with the targeting level,32
we can show the same result as Proposition 3:
Proposition 4. In the separating equilibrium, the low quality firm chooses the highest tar-
geting level T ; the high quality firm’s profit is decreasing with its level of targeting and it
chooses the lowest targeting level t if
Lc =
F (p∗H(tH)− L; tH)− F (p
∗
H(tH)−H ; tH)






is decreasing in tH .
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
That is, with a general targeting technology characterized by (λ(t), c(t)), the high quality
firm chooses a low targeting level when the proportion of departing consumers from the
mimicking low quality firm, adjusted for cost and efficiency of targeting, is decreasing with
the level of targeting. When F (x; t) is differentiable, this is equivalent to
∂π̃(pH , H ; tH)/∂t
−∂π̃(pH , H ; tH)/∂pH
<
∂π̃(pH , L; tH)/∂t
−∂π̃(pH , L; tH)/∂pH
.
where π̃ is the per period profit adjusted for efficiency and cost of targeting π̃(p, q; t) =
λ(t)p[1− F (p− q; t)]− c(t)
1+β
. Thus, our result naturally extends to incorporate differences in
32Otherwise, no firm would choose a positive level of targeting. This amounts to say that the cost of
targeted advertising does not increase too fast with the level of targeting.
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effectiveness and cost of advertising with different targeting levels. To get more insights into






We focus on the left-hand side of Condition (5), as it is straightforward to show that the
right-hand side of Condition (5) is independent of λ(t) and c(t). We consider first the case













which is clearly decreasing when c′(t) becomes larger (recall that a necessary condition for
(5) to be satisfied is ∂f/∂t < 0). That is, it is more likely that the high quality firm chooses
low targeting when the cost of targeted advertising increases fast with the level of targeting.
This reason is simple: choosing lower targeting not only saves the signaling cost but also
saves the direct cost of advertising. Now consider the case where advertising with different










[1− F (p− q; t)]− ∂F (p−q;t)
∂t
,
which is increasing in λ′(t)/λ(t) under Assumption 1. That is, it is less likely that the
high quality firm chooses low targeting when the elasticity of effectiveness with respect to
targeting is large. The intuition is also straightforward: as the elasticity becomes larger, the
firm forgoes a larger benefit when opting for a lower level of targeting.
The simple reasoning highlights the three-fold trade-off faced by the high quality firm
when choosing a lower level of targeting: it is less effective, but it is less costly and also
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saves signaling cost. Hence, when the benefit (direct advertising cost saving and signaling
cost saving) outweighs the cost (less effective advertising), it is in the interest of the high
quality firm to opt for less targeting.
5.2 Investment in Quality
The analysis can be easily adapted to incorporate the firm’s investment in quality. One way
is to assume that by exerting a level of effort e, at cost C(e), the firm produces a high quality
product with probability e and a low quality product with probability 1 − e. Neither the
level of effort nor the outcome/product quality is observable to consumers. The expected
profit of the firm, for a given level of targeting, is
Eπ = eπ∗H(t) + (1− e)π
∗
L(t)− C(e),
which leads to the optimal investment e∗ satisfying
C ′(e∗) = π∗H(t)− π
∗
L(t) = ∆π.
Our results then imply that if F (p− L; t) − F (p− H ; t) is increasing in t, better targeting
increases a firm’s incentive to invest in improving quality; On the other hand, if F (p−L; t)−
F (p−H ; t) is decreasing in t and the condition in Proposition 2 is satisfied, better targeting
reduces the incentive to invest in improving quality. When different levels of targeting can be
used, a lower level of targeting then not only signals high quality but also high investment.
5.3 Targeting Technology
Our analysis is carried out with targeting represented by a general functional form. It is
useful to apply our analysis to some specific forms of targeting.
30
A commonly used form of targeting is that firms send advertising messages to those
consumers with a value/signal of value higher than a threshold. This strategy can be easily
incorporated in our general analysis. Assuming the distribution of consumers’ valuations
is given by G(x) (the density function is denoted by g(x)), a targeting level t allows the
firm to send ad messages to consumers with valuations above t. Hence, the distribution of
consumers’ valuations associated with a targeting level t is




It is easy to show that F (x; t) is decreasing in t (strictly decreasing for x in the interior of the
support). Moreover, we have f(x; t) = g(x)
1−G(t)
, which is increasing in t (strictly increasing for
x in the interior of the support). Hence, we must have F (p− L; t)− F (p−H ; t) increasing
in t whenever price is interior. Thus, with this type of threshold targeting, the high quality
firm benefits more according to Proposition 1.
Another way is to target consumers from different groups. Consider two groups of con-
sumers, group 1 and group 2, the valuation distribution of which are given by G1(x) and
G2(x) respectively, with G2(x) < G1(x), i.e. group 2 is the more valuable group in the sense
of First-Order Stochastic Dominance. A targeting level t identifies a consumer from group
2 with probability t, i.e. the associated valuation distribution is
F (x; t) = (1− t)G1(x) + tG2(x).
In this differentiable case, we have ∂
2F (x;t)
∂x∂t
= g2(x) − g1(x). Thus, a necessary condition for
the high quality firm to prefer a lower level of targeting is g2(x) < g1(x), which could occur
when the valuation of Group 2 consumers is distributed on a support with greater upper
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bound compared to that of Group 1 consumers, that is, when Group 2 consumers have higher
but also more dispersed valuations.
6 Concluding Remarks
We conclude our paper with discussions on the managerial implications and directions for
future work.
In this paper, we show that a high level of targeting may increase the signaling cost of a
high quality firm by attenuating the informational content of a high price, and thus the high
quality firm may find it optimal to choose a lower level of targeting. In general, this is the
case when the profit is less elastic to targeting and more elastic to price, hence, the signaling
cost-saving from reducing price distortion outweighs the forgone benefit of targeting. Such a
de-targeting strategy is more likely to be optimal when the product features a mass-market
position, i.e., when quality is relatively important compared to the horizontal preferences
and/or when the available targeting technology is not too accurate. More specifically, this
is the case when targeting allows the firm to reduce the mass of marginal consumers, who
have relatively low horizontal match values. Such a strategy is especially relevant for new
experience goods with a large variation of quality, for which the asymmetric information
problem is more severe. In the meantime, such a de-targeting strategy is more appropriate
when the aim of the marketing campaign is to generate sales, so that consumer trust and
quality inference become more important. Hence, for an established brand with known
quality, highly targeted ads (e.g., social media, display ads, emails) can be an effective
way to reach potential consumers and distribute information about new products. For a
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new brand/product with uncertain quality that aims at raising market share, de-targeting
(e.g., search ads, direct mails, offline ads) becomes more effective in building consumer trust
and promoting sales. When continuous investment is needed to sustain a high quality, for
instance, for credence goods, de-targeting can further serve as a signal of such investment.
Our results also have implications on advertising agencies. Our analysis applies to situa-
tions where firms advertise directly to consumers or indirectly through competitive advertis-
ing agencies, as long as the cost/price of advertising is not strategically chosen. In the latter
situation, our results suggest that competitive advertising agencies with different levels of
targeting may attract different types of firms. This points to an interesting extension of our
analysis: it would be valuable to investigate how advertising agencies with pricing power
would strategically choose their levels of targeting33 and prices of their advertising services.
This would provide useful insights and deepen our understanding of the advertising market.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The profit maximization problem of the firm with quality q is
max πM(p, q; t) = p · [(1 + β)(1− F (p− q; t))].
The profit-maximizing price satisfies the first order condition:
(1 + β)[1− F (p− q; t)− pf(p− q; t)] = 0.
By Assumption 1, the left-hand side is decreasing in p, increasing in q, and increasing in t.
Thus, the complete information price is a well-defined interior solution, which is increasing
in q and increasing in t. Furthermore, by the principle of revealed preference, for t′ > t, we
have
πM(p(t′), q; t′) ≥ πM(p(t), q; t′) ≥ πM(p(t), q; t),
hence, the complete information profit is increasing in t.
A.2 Pooling Equilibrium
We provide an argument for the non-existence of pooling equilibrium. Intuitive criterion
says that if a deviation is profitable for one type of firm, but not for the other type of firm
even with the most favorable expectation, then upon observing such a deviation, consumers
believe it is from the profiting firm. Suppose a pooling equilibrium with price pp exists,
define a price p′ such that
πp(pp, qe, L; t) = π(p′, H, L; t),
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i.e. p′ is such that the low quality firm is indifferent between staying with the pooling
equilibrium and deviating to p′ when such a deviation is believed to be from a high quality
firm. That is, p′ satisfies
pp[1− F (pp − qe, t) + β(1− F (pp − L; t)]
= p′[1− F (p′ −H ; t) + β(1− F (p′ − L; t)].
Then it is easy to show that
pp[1− F (pp − qe; t) + β(1− F (pp − qe; t)]
< p′[1− F (p′ −H ; t) + β(1− F (p′ −H ; t)],




. Thus, a deviation from the pooling price pp to p > p′ is
only profitable for the high quality firm, but not for the low quality firm even when consumer
believes the deviating firm is of high quality. Therefore, the high quality firm always has a
profitable deviation from the pooling equilibrium, and hence a pooling equilibrium does not
exist.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
As a standard procedure in signaling games, we can solve a relaxed problem with only ICL
and then check the second constraint pH ≥ 0 is satisfied. To keep the notations concise,
we simply let pL = p
∗
L(t) and pH = p
∗
H(t). Following such a procedure, in the separating
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equilibrium, ICL must be binding and the price pH satisfies





= pH [1− F (pH −H ; t)] + βpH [1− F (pH − L; t)]










Consider an increase in the level of targeting from t to t′, with the corresponding prices




H). The change in the profit difference ∆π can be decomposed
as
∆π′ −∆π = βpH [F (pH − L; t
′)− F (pH −H ; t
′)]− βpH[F (pH − L; t)− F (pH −H ; t)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Effect of Targeting ∆t
+ βp′H[F (p
′
H − L; t
′)− F (p′H −H ; t
′)]− βpH [F (pH − L; t
′)− F (pH −H ; t
′)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect of Price ∆p
The direct effect of targeting ∆t is positive by assumption that L is increasing in t. The





F (p− L; t′) + pf(p− L; t′)− (F (p−H ; t′) + pf(p−H ; t′))
]
dp
The integrand is positive following from Assumption 1 (specifically, F (p− q; t)+ pf(p− q; t)
is decreasing in q). Furthermore, we also have p′H > pH . To see this, notice that (pL, pH)
satisfies
(1 + β)pL[1− F (pL − L; t)] = pH [1− F (pH −H ; t)] + βpH [1− F (pH − L; t)].
The right hand side is decreasing in pH , hence, p
′
H > pH is equivalent to
(1 + β)[p′L(1− F (p
′
L − L; t
′))− pL(1− F (pL − L; t))]
< pH [F (pH −H ; t)− F (pH −H ; t




By assumption, we have F (pH −L; t
′)−F (pH −H ; t
′) > F (pH −L; t)−F (pH −H ; t), hence,
F (pH −H ; t)− F (pH −H ; t
′) > F (pH − L; t)− F (pH − L; t
′).
Thus, a sufficient condition for Condition (7) is
p′L(1− F (p
′
L − L; t






′))− pH(1−F (pH −L; t
′)) < pL(1−F (pL −L; t))− pH(1−F (pH −L; t)).
In fact, we have
p′L(1− F (p
′
L − L; t















[1− F (p− L; t)− pf(p− L; t)]dp
= pL(1− F (pL − L; t))− pH(1− F (pH − L; t)),
where the first inequality follows from Assumption 1 and the integrand being negative, and
the second inequality follows from pL < p
′
L, which also follows from Assumption 1. In sum,
this means p′H > pH and hence ∆p is also positive. Thus, ∆π
′ > ∆π.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
As above, let pL = p
∗
L(t) and pH = p
∗
H(t). From Equation (6), ∆π is decreasing in t if
pH [F (pH − L; t)− F (pH −H ; t)] is decreasing in t, and we have
pH =
(1 + β)π∗L(t)
1− F (pH −H ; t) + β[1− F (pH − L; t)]
.
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F (pH − L; t)− F (pH −H ; t)
1− F (pH −H ; t) + β(1− F (pH − L; t))
is decreasing in t. Notice that, in this case, the direct effect of targeting becomes negative
while the indirect effect of price can still be positive and dominate. Thus, to quantify these
two effects, we turn to the case when F (x; t) is differentiable in t, which allows us to apply the
Implicit Function Theorem to quantify the price effect. Specifically, d∆π/dt < 0 if (where
























which can be rewritten as
[1− F (pH −H ; t)− pHf(pH −H ; t)] + β[1− F (pH − L; t)− pHf(pH − L; t)]





































1− F (pH −H ; t)− pHf(pH −H ; t)





























1− F (pH −H ; t)− pHf(pH −H ; t)
1− F (pH − L; t)− pHf(pH − L; t)
.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
In the separating equilibrium, the low quality firm chooses targeting level T and the cor-
responding complete information price p∗L(T ) = p
M(L;T ). If the high quality firm chooses
targeting level tH , the corresponding equilibrium price satisfies
(1 + β) p∗L(T )[1− F (p
∗
L(T )− L;T )]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
πLL












The profit of the high quality firm is simply π∗H(tH) = (1 + β)πHH . The high quality firm
will thus choose the lowest targeting level if πHH is decreasing in tH . As above, to simplify
the exposition, we simply let pH = p
∗
H(tH). Notice that, since πLL no longer depends on tH ,
the left hand side of Equation (8) is constant. Hence, πHH is decreasing in tH if πHL/πHH
is increasing in tH . That is, if
1− F (p∗H(tH)− L; tH)
1− F (p∗H(tH)−H ; tH)
is increasing in tH , which is equivalent to
Ld =
F (p∗H(tH)− L; tH)− F (p
∗
H(tH)−H ; tH)
1− F (p∗H(tH)−H ; tH)
is decreasing in tH . If p
∗
H(tH) is invariant to tH , then Ld is clearly decreasing in tH when
F (p − L; tH) − F (p −H ; tH) is decreasing in tH . Yet, p
∗
H(tH) also increases as tH becomes
higher (as the right hand side of Equation (8) is decreasing in pH). Hence, to quantify the




∂F (pH −H ; tH)
∂t















[1 − F (pH −H ; tH)− pHf(pH −H ; tH) + β[1− F (pH − L; tH)− pHf(pH − L; tH)
,







1− F (pH −H ; tH)− pHf(pH −H ; tH)
1− F (pH − L; tH)− pHf(pH − L; tH)
.
The condition can be rewritten as
∂F (pH−H;tH)
∂t




1− F (pH − L; tH)− pHf(pH − L; tH)
,
which is equivalent to
∂π(pH , H ; tH)/∂t
∂π(pH , H ; tH)/∂p
>
∂π(pH , L; tH)/∂t
∂π(pH , L; tH)/∂p
,
where π(p, q, t) = p[1− F (p− q; t)] is the per-period profit. A sufficient condition is then
∂
∂π(pH , q; tH)/∂t
∂π(pH , q; tH)/∂p
∂q
> 0,
which is satisfied if
∂2π(pH , q; tH)
∂t∂q
∂π(pH , q; tH)
∂p
−
∂π(pH , q; tH)
∂t























A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows similar steps of the proof of Proposition 3. Given that, in the separating
equilibrium, the low quality firm chooses T and the corresponding complete information
price, the choice of (pH , tH) by the high quality firm must satisfy
(1 + β)λ(T )pL[1− F (pL − L;T )]− c(T )
= λ(tH)pH [1− F (pH −H ; tH)] + βλ(tH)pH [1− F (pH − L; tH)]− c(tH),
which can be rewritten as












































Together, the two equation implies that dπHH/dt < 0 if
pH












λ(tH)[1− F (pH −H ; tH)− pHf(pH −H ; tH)]
λ(tH)[1− F (pH − L; tH)− pHf(pH − L; tH)]
,
or equivalently,
∂π̃(pH , H ; tH)/∂t
∂π̃(pH , H ; tH)/∂pH
>
∂π̃(pH , L; tH)/∂t
∂π̃(pH , L; tH)/∂pH
.







B An Example with Exponential Distribution
We present an example with exponential distribution in this appendix, i.e.,
F (x; t) = 1− e−
x
t .
The cumulative distribution and density distribution are plotted below for different values
of t.


















































































































Figure 3: CDF (Left) and PDF (Right) of the Exponential Distribution
However, the exponential distribution does not satisfy Assumption 1. To be more specific,
F (p− q; t) + pf(p − q; t) is not everywhere decreasing in q.34 This means that Proposition
1 no longer applies, the proof of which relies on Assumption 1, and some of our compar-
ison between Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 and 3 does not apply either. Nevertheless,
Proposition 2 and 3 still apply as the proof does not rely on Assumption 1. Especially, the
34It is decreasing in q for p < t and increasing in q for p > t.
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which is always satisfied. That is, de-targeting is always optimal in the case of exponential
distribution.35 Although the relationship between the high quality firm’s profit and the level
of targeting can be non-monotone, it is always profitable for the high quality firm to choose
a lower level of targeting than the low quality firm. This is shown in the following figure
(drawn for β = 1 and t ∈ [0.5, 1.5]).



































































































Figure 4: Impact of Targeting on Profit Difference (Left) and Optimal Targeting (Right)
The right panel of Figure 4 illustrates that de-targeting is always optimal for the high
quality firm. Furthermore, as in the example of linear density function, a lower level of
targeting is chosen when the average quality is higher. It also shows that a lower level of
targeting is chosen when the quality difference is large (i.e., the quality uncertainty is large).
35Notice that, although exponential distribution does not satisfy Assumption 1, we can check that a pooling
equilibrium does not exist. Hence, we can focus on the separating equilibrium.
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